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In New Zealand regulation at present is 
carried out by a series of ad hoc balancing 
processes, each specific to its own piece of 
legislation. Probably we often get it wrong. 
Certainly there are problems. It has been a 
problem all my adult life in all the various 
connections I have had with the New 
Zealand government over a period now of 
40 years. Government regulation and the 
quality of it has been an enduring issue. 
The prime issue is whether the proposed 
solution is acceptable and will actually fix 
the problem. 
One significant gap in these 
presentations has been that no ministers 
have spoken. Yet the rights and prerogatives 
of ministers are greatly affected by 
these proposals. What is proposed is a 
weakening of the capacity of ministers to 
decide how regulatory policy decisions 
should be made. I really do wonder what 
ministers will think of this. Ministers tend 
to take the view, in my experience, that 
they are elected to make decisions. That is 
their function. Measures that inhibit their 
capacity to take decisions are often not 
welcome. 
What is proposed here is a serious 
diminution in the range of ministerial 
responsibility. We have to contemplate the 
suggested changes against that background 
principle of our parliamentary democracy. 
Ministerial responsibility is the prime 
instrument of accountability in our 
democratic framework. Ministers must 
answer to the House and defend their 
policies to the public. Cabinet has a 
collective responsibility. What is proposed 
here cuts across that and imposes a set 
of self-denying ordinances on ministers. 
My prediction is that ministers will not 
support such an arrangement. The reason 
is that the proposal will reduce their ability 
to address the concerns of the public and 
it will reduce their capacity to govern in 
accordance with their policy preferences.
The implied message in the changes 
proposed are that ministers make bad 
choices and must be prevented from 
making them. In democratic terms this is 
a highly arguable proposition. 
We can learn something about this 
from the experience with the Regulations 
(Disallowance) Act 1989. That legislation 
provided for parliamentary disallowance 
of statutory regulations. No motion for 
disallowance has ever yet succeeded in 
having a regulation disallowed. Parliament 
has not shown courage in this matter. 
If the parliament is not prepared to deal 
to the executive, the question arises, who 
is? The experience with the Regulations 
(Disallowance) Act raises the whole 
question of whether what is proposed in 
this set of proposals is practical. What was 
designed to be a heavy check on executive 
power has not proved to be much of an 
inhibition on it in respect to regulations. 
There is no doubt that the Regulations 
Review Committee has done great work. 
There is no doubt that it has developed 
a very important body of jurisprudence. 
But the fact that Parliament has never 
been prepared to actually disallow a 
regulation suggests to me that the House 
of Representatives is not really prepared 
to take on the executive on regulation in 
any serious way. 
If that is the case, and that is the true 
What is proposed amounts to a substantial constitutional 
change. It can be seen as a shift in power away from the 
executive branch of government towards the courts.  
The legitimate source for this shift of power remains  
unclear. To be successful, constitutional changes have to  
be enduring. I do not detect any widespread public  
consensus on the issues surrounding this set of changes. 
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lesson from our recent history, it seems 
to me unlikely that the situation can be 
rectified by ex ante legislative controls of 
the type contained in the proposal we are 
discussing. 
The biggest problem that law making 
faces in New Zealand is the three-year 
term. That is the greatest enemy of 
good policy development and good 
law making. Things have to be hurried. 
Particularly when a new government 
comes to office, it takes them some time 
to settle in. It takes them quite a while 
to sort out their legislative priorities 
once they have the benefit of advice. If 
they are engaged in big policy changes 
with complex issues involving large 
acts of parliament, then it takes a long 
time to get the policy decisions made 
and the legislation drafted, introduced 
and passed. The biggest change that 
we could make that would be likely to 
produce higher quality law is to extend 
the term of parliament from three years 
to four and make it a fixed term. But the 
prospects of that happening are not high 
given the fact that a referendum rejected 
that possibility in 1990. Probably most 
members of the public regard a general 
election as the only real power they have 
to turn a government out.
In his paper Paul Rishworth is 
admirably clear on some changes he felt 
could be made to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. He would add a property 
protection to the act. The difficulty with 
including property in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act is that it would be 
necessary to go through the whole statute 
book and look at 1,100 existing statutes 
to work out which of those involved 
interference with property rights now 
and how that matter should be handled. 
Otherwise, the costs and consequences 
of such a change would be drastic and 
uncertain. Such work would take some 
years. 
Professor Rishworth’s other point, 
that there should be only one New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and not a 
second one, seems to me to be a strong 
point with which I agree. He would add 
some features of this proposal to that. I 
think that such a process would need to 
be handled with some care. 
Richard Ekins makes the case about 
juridical law making quite strongly. He is 
opposed to it. He thinks it should be left to 
the democratic polity. He argued that the 
rules in the bill are not constitutionally 
orthodox, and I agree with him. 
The major point that arises out of 
all the papers is the justiciable character 
of the proposal. To have court cases 
and forensic battles over procedural 
matters concerning legislative regulatory 
proposals opens a fresh dimension not 
contemplated in New Zealand before. 
Judges in New Zealand have handled 
the provisions of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act very well, in my opinion. 
They are used to dealing with the matters 
covered by the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. They always 
have been, long before 1990. Most of 
those matters, such as search and seizure, 
arrest, legal advice, detention and police 
powers are familiar to judges and to 
criminal lawyers. 
Neither the judges nor the legal 
profession are proficient in policy 
analysis of the type that leads to 
regulatory legislative proposals. It does 
seem to me that it is rather a stretch to 
ask the judiciary to take on this new role 
and expect it to be performed in a way 
that does not disrupt the processes of the 
executive government. 
Tim Smith’s case for the proposal is 
that it really isn’t so bad and we don’t 
have anything to fear. The courts will not 
be too assertive, he argues. I doubt this. I 
also doubt that ministers will share that 
view. Taking power away from ministers 
and giving it to the courts is bound to 
produce a different set of dynamics from 
what occurs now. The mechanism of 
certification, the power of interpretation 
and the ability to issue declarations of 
incompatibility, in my view, all amount 
to a very significant transfer of power, 
notwithstanding protestations to the 
contrary. 
In many ways making legislation is 
difficult enough without adding further 
complexities to the process. I have in 
mind Bismark’s observation that making 
law is a bit like making sausages and best 
not observed. This, of course, suggests 
that the process shouldn’t be transparent. 
I certainly think the legislative process 
should be as transparent as possible. But 
the part of it that is conducted within 
the executive branch of government is 
different on every occasion, with different 
interests, different topics and different 
departments involved. 
I come now to George Tanner’s 
powerful paper. Let me stress the 
conclusion which he did not read to you 
but I want to set out in full again:
“The bill falls short of complying 
with many of its own principles. Its 
use of open-textured language leads to 
uncertainty of meaning. It attempts to 
define good law making by reference to 
a set of simple principles: in doing so it 
obscures the complexities inherent in 
them and creates the same lack of clarity 
and uncertainty that it seeks to prevent. 
Legislating is a complex business. The 
bill suggests it is not. The bill suffers 
from an acute lack of problem definition 
and does not properly identify and 
assess workable alternatives. Without 
massive additional resources, it would be 
impossible to make all existing legislation 
compliant with the principles in the 
bill within ten years: the time frame is 
unrealistic and unachievable. The bill 
is a disproportionate and inappropriate 
response to the issue it seeks to redress. 
“The bill overlaps with existing 
legislation, restating provisions of 
current statutes in subtly different 
ways, and in doing so risks creating 
uncertainty and confusion. It is 
inevitable that the bill would alter the 
way legislation is interpreted forcing 
a return to a methodology long ago 
abandoned by the courts in favour of 
an approach that explicitly recognises 
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the paramount role of the legislature in a 
modern parliamentary democracy. There 
is a failure to recognise the impact that 
the short parliamentary term and other 
features of the political and parliamentary 
system have on law making. 
“The bill will bring the courts into 
areas of law making that are not within 
their province and for which they lack 
institutional competence, requiring them 
to adjudicate on choices made by 
democratically-elected governments on 
complex social and economic issues and 
the allocation of resources. It will redefine 
the relationship between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of 
government and risks damaging the 
comity between them that is critical to a 
stable society.”
The dance of legislation is always 
different from one instance to another 
and pretty difficult to generalise about. 
Economic benefits are not the sole factor 
to be taken into account. Constitutional 
principle, ministerial responsibility and 
the capacity of ministers to govern are 
also important elements. 
1  The article is a summation of the preceding four articles on 
legal issues which were presented as papers in the first part 
of the February 2010 IPS symposium chaired by Sir Geoffrey.
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